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Abstract 
This article investigates the relationship between discretionary loan loss provisions and bank 
intangibles among African banks. Prior studies examine how intangible assets affect firms’ 
profitability and valuation decisions with almost no focus on the role of loan loss provisions. 
We investigate whether banks increase (decrease) loan loss provisions in response to risks 
associated with investment in intangible assets. We find that discretionary loan loss 
provisions are inversely associated with bank intangible assets and change in intangible 
assets, but the inverse association is weakened in environments with strong investor 
protection. We also observe that income smoothing is reduced among banks that have large 
intangible asset investment, while income smoothing is pronounced among banks that have 
few intangible asset investments, but this behaviour is reduced for banks in environments 
with strong minority shareholders’ right protection. 
 
Keywords: Banks, Income smoothing, Financial Institutions, Financial reporting, Intangible 
assets, Loan loss provisions, Signalling, Bank Valuation, Bank Risk-taking, Africa. 
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1. Introduction 
This article investigates the relationship between discretionary loan loss provisions and bank 
intangibles among African banks. Intangible assets have been rising on bank balance sheets 
and are growing in importance. Intangible assets pose unique challenges to auditors in 
terms of complexity and judgment (Visvanathan, 2017), and pose some challenge to banks 
in terms of measurement and valuation and pose a challenge to standard setters in terms of 
classification of unidentifiable intangible assets. 
 
Investment in intangible assets pose some risks to banks, and banks will adopt several 
techniques to mitigate the risks emanating from intangible assets investment. Among the 
set of techniques that banks can adopt, banks can use discretionary accounting numbers to 
reduce intangible asset investment risk. Surprisingly, there is little knowledge in the 
literature about specific accounting techniques (or numbers) that banks employ to mitigate 
intangible asset investment risk; hence, this is worth investigating given the important role 
of financial reporting for banks’ risk management and firm stability objectives. This study is 
the first attempt in the literature to link bank loan loss provisions with bank intangibles 
while controlling for institutional differences (investor protection) across countries. 
  
Bank loan loss provision is an amount set aside by banks to mitigate expected losses on 
bank loan portfolio. Studies show that banks can use discretionary loan loss provisions to 
smooth income, to manage capital levels or to signal information about firm’s earnings 
prospects (see, Scholes et al, 1990; Kanagaretnam et al, 2005; Leventis et al, 2012; Curcio 
and Hasan, 2015; Ozili, 2018, etc.), implying that reported loan loss provisions estimate is 
not solely driven by credit risk considerations but by other considerations (see, Ozili and 
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Outa, 2017). We extend this observation in the literature to the case of intangible assets to 
detect whether the level of discretionary provisions is also influenced by intangible asset 
investment risks. 
 
An intangible asset is ‘an identifiable non-monetary asset without physical substance’ (IASB, 
2004: p.2), or ‘a non-current, non-financial claim to future benefits that lacks a physical or 
financial term’ (FASB, 2001; p.6). Bank intangible assets are non-physical assets including 
human capital, intellectual capital, social capital (or business relationships), ideas and 
knowledge about the banking, economic and business environment that generate value and 
income to banks to improve bank equity valuation both in primitive and modern economies.  
 
From a system perspective, bank intangibles are a subset of economic intangibles which in 
turn are a subset of cultural intangibles and are cumulative, synergistic, and frequently 
inseparable from other tangible assets and are not owned by any single bank or firm (Basu 
and Waymire, 2008). For this reason, we take a holistic approach to bank intangibles rather 
than separating them into individual components, and we also focus on the accounting 
value of total intangibles rather than a separate accounting value for individual intangible 
assets of banks. By intangible asset investment, we mean the total value of intangible assets 
reported in bank balance sheet.  
 
Investment in intangible assets are crucial for banks, and such investment in intangible 
assets provide benefits and risks to banks (Chen et al, 2014; Donaldson, 2016). One risk that 
intangible assets pose to banks is the risk that investment in intangible assets will not yield 
its anticipated gains in the future. Bank managers are concerned about this risk, and their 
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concern is further amplified when bank shareholders and potential investors are sceptical 
about investment in intangible assets particularly when shareholders view intangible assets 
as mere propositions that are subject to technological risk, reputation risk and related 
uncertainties. In response to these risk concerns, we argue that bank managers may keep 
additional or fewer loan loss provisions in response to unexpected (or abnormal) changes in 
intangible asset investment, and this behaviour can have significant signalling effect to 
shareholders. 
 
We obtain bank data for intangibles and loan loss provisions for several African countries 
from Bankscope database for the 2002 to 2014 period. We find that discretionary loan loss 
provisions are inversely associated with intangible assets and change in intangible assets, 
but the association is weakened in strong investor protection environments. Income 
smoothing is reduced when African banks that have large intangible asset investments. We 
find that income smoothing is more pronounced among African banks that have few 
intangible asset investments but this behavior is reduced among banks in strong investor 
protection environments. 
 
This study makes three contributions to the literature. One, we contribute to the literature 
that examine the role of accounting numbers for effective risk management (e.g., Bushman 
and Williams, 2012; Cohen et al, 2014; Riro et al, 2016). By focussing on intangible asset 
investment risk, we provide some insights to understand how the level of bank provisions 
may be driven by the need to set-aside additional provisions ‘buffer’ to mitigate or manage 
the risks emanating from investment in intangible assets. It is important to understand 
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whether bank managers use their provisioning discretion to influence loan loss provisions 
estimate in response to changes in investment in intangible assets. 
 
Two, we contribute to the literature that investigate the influence of institutional factors on 
bank financial reporting behaviour (e.g., Amor, 2017; Ozili, 2018; Curcio and Hasan, 2015; 
Fonseca and Gonzalez, 2008). By controlling for investor protection differences, we provide 
insights to understand how the level of investor protection can influence the association 
between loan loss provisions and bank intangibles. Three, we examine banks in a region that 
do not have standardised reporting for bank intangibles – the African region, and this allows 
us to ensure that the reported values for bank intangibles reflect (and incorporate) 
significant managerial discretion, so that we can gain some insights on whether managerial 
discretion in provisioning is influenced by the risk associated with intangible asset 
investment.  
 
The remainder of the study is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the conceptual 
framework and the literature review. We discuss the accounting disclosure for intangibles 
and bank intangibles. We also review the literature on discretionary provisions and 
intangibles. Section 3 develops the hypothesis. Section 4 presents the data and 
methodology. Section 5 presents and discuss the empirical results. Section 6 concludes. 
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2. Conceptual Framework and Literature Review 
2.1. Intangibles: Disclosure Rules and Evidence 
Under IFRS and FASB accounting frameworks, intangible investments should be expensed or 
capitalised when incurred, and should be the case if all intangible investments are classified 
as intangible assets; but in reality, not all intangible investments of firms are considered as 
intangible assets (Lev, 2001). According to the IASB, intangible investments are considered 
as ‘intangible assets’ in the balance sheet of firms if intangible investments represent ‘an 
identifiable non-monetary asset without physical substance’ (IASB, 2004: p.2), or if 
intangible investments represent ‘a non-current, non-financial claim to future benefits that 
lacks a physical or financial term’ (FASB, 2001; p.6). Lev (2001) points out the weakness of 
these two accounting frameworks for intangibles.  
 
Lev (2001) use the case of employee skill and knowledge as an example and points out that 
although firms invest in employee training, firms do not own the employees or the ideas in 
the head of employees. Employees can switch employers as quickly as possible; hence this 
kind of intangible investment cannot be capitalised or expensed based on the current 
accounting framework. Clearly, Lev (2001) demonstrates that the current accounting 
framework has issues related with the recognition of intangible investments.  
According to IASB IAS 38 and FASB SFAC5, the recognition criterion for intangible 
investment is the ‘reliability of measurement of asset cost’. This recognition criterion is also 
criticised because it is difficult to reliably measure internally-generated assets such as 
software, trademarks, patents etc. Also, the lack of recognition of some intangible 
investments as “intangible assets” is mainly due to issues related to the identification, 
measurement, and control of intangibles (Zéghal and Maaloul, 2011); and has consequences 
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for the value-relevance of financial information (Lev and Zarowin, 1999; Brown et al, 1999), 
resource allocation in equity markets (Seow et al, 2006), and firm market value (Eberhart et 
al, 2004; Garcia-Ayuso, 2003). 
 
Regarding disclosures, firms may voluntarily disclose information about intangibles to lower 
the consequences of the recognition issues associated with intangible investments. Jones 
(2007) observe that managers of intangibles-intensive firms voluntarily disclose additional 
information on intangible investments in financial reports and conference calls to explain 
firm market value when financial information is perceived to be less value-relevant. 
Kristandl and Bontis (2007) observe that firms engage in, and increase forward-looking 
disclosures on intangibles to lower the cost of capital. Orens et al (2009) find similar result, 
while Vergauwen et al (2007) show that firms disclose additional information on intangibles 
when they have higher intangible assets. Abdolmohammadi (2005) show that increased 
disclosure of intangibles information in financial reports is followed by increase in market 
capitalization in high-technology US firms. 
 
Oliveira et al (2010), in a study of firms in the Portuguese stock exchange, find that the 
change to IAS/IFRS had no impact on the value relevance of total intangible assets as a 
whole, but find evidence for increased value relevance when the subclasses of identifiable 
intangible assets are considered. Visvanathan (2017) argue that, in contrast to tangible 
assets, intangible assets pose unique challenges to auditors in terms judgment and 
complexity, and find that auditors charge higher fees for firms with higher proportion of 
intangible assets on the balance sheet. Regarding firm performance, Andonova and Ruíz-
Pava (2016) investigate the performance of Colombian firms and find that intangible assets 
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are drivers of firm performance, implying that intangible assets give firms a competitive 
advantage in an emerging environment. However, the propensity to invest in intangibles 
may depend on the characteristic of the firm. Arrighetti et al (2014) show that firms with 
higher human capital, larger size, and a large intangible asset base have greater propensity 
to invest in intangible assets. 
 
2.2. Bank Intangibles and Risk 
As we stated earlier, bank intangibles consist of human capital, core depositor relationships, 
mortgage and other loan servicing relationships, credit card customer relationships, leasing 
customer relationships, brand names, computer software and technologies (including bank 
account management software and financing accounting software) and the associated 
databases that operate on bank’s software (Reily, 2010), and these intangible assets 
generate value and income to improve bank equity valuation both in primitive and modern 
economies (Basu and Waymire, 2008). 
The valuation of bank intangibles is important for financial reporting purposes, intangible 
asset sale and ownership transfer purposes, tax planning and compliance purposes, 
infringement and litigation claims purposes, commercial dispute resolution purposes, 
corporate management information purposes, corporate governance and contractual 
compliance purposes, bankruptcy and firm restructuring purposes. Also, the valuation of 
bank intangible assets involves the experience and expertise of economists, academics, 
industry consultants, licensing executives, business appraisers that provide some 
combination of financial analysis, empirical research, due diligence, and practical experience 
and skills to generate a fair value for bank intangible assets.  
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Regarding disclosure, banks may have weak incentive to use greater disclosures on 
intangibles to lower their cost of capital or to improve the value relevance of financial 
information simply because banks are not intangibles-intensive firms compared to 
technological firms. However, bank managers that have concerns about whether investment 
in intangible assets will yield its anticipated benefits may set aside some ‘safety net’ or 
‘provisions’ to mitigate this risk. Alternatively, if it becomes apparent that investment in 
intangible assets will not yield its anticipated benefits, bank managers can find ways to 
signal this information to investors or outsiders1, and this is intuitive because managers use 
accounting numbers to signal private information to bank owners or outsiders to reduce the 
adverse selection problem arising from information asymmetry. Taken together, we argue 
that banks can use loan loss provisions to signal information about intangibles, or may use 
loan loss provisions as a safety net to mitigate the risks arising from investment in intangible 
assets. 
 
2.3. Loan Loss Provisions: Evidence 
Some studies show that banks use loan loss provisions estimate as a tool to signal 
information about banks’ future prospect (Ozili and Outa, 2017). For instance, Beaver et al 
(1989) investigate US banks and find that loan loss provisions are correlated with bank 
market values indicating that loan loss provisions are used to signal bank’s financial 
strength. Beaver and Engel (1996) also observe a positive effect of discretionary loan loss 
provisions on stock price for US banks indicating signalling via loan loss provisions. Wahlen 
(1994) find that US banks increase discretionary loan loss provisions to signal positive 
                                                          
1 This supports the view of Akerlof (1970) who demonstrate that firms will signal information to firm owners to 
reduce adverse selection problems arising from asymmetric information between managers and firm owners. 
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information about future cash flow to investors. Liu et al (1997) observe a positive market 
reaction to unexpected increase in loan loss provisions among banks with low regulatory 
capital levels and only in the fourth fiscal quarter. Kanagaretnam et al (2005) observe that 
US banks use loan loss provisions to signal information about banks prospects but the 
propensity to use provisions for signalling purposes is greater among smaller banks. Leventis 
et al (2012) investigate whether EU listed commercial banks use loan loss provisions to 
signal information about banks’ future prospect after IFRS adoption, and find that financially 
distressed banks use loan loss provisions to signal firm’s future prospect. On the other hand, 
Kanagaretnam et al (2004) investigate US banks, and find that banks use loan loss provisions 
to smooth income but not to signal private information about bank’s future. Ozili (2015) find 
weak evidence for signalling via loan loss provisions among Nigerian banks. Curcio and 
Hasan (2015) find that non-Euro Area credit institutions use loan loss provisions for income 
smoothing purposes more than for capital management and signalling purposes. Morris et 
al (2016) investigate the economic determinants and value relevance of US banks’ loan loss 
provisions during the global financial crisis. They find that discretionary provisions are used 
for smoothing and signalling when the two incentives reinforce each other, but smoothing 
occurs more frequently. Overall, evidence for signalling via loan loss provisions is mixed in 
the literature.  
 
Regarding investor protection, Ozili (2018) investigate the non-discretionary determinants 
of bank loan loss provisions in Africa and find that non-performing loans, loan-to-asset ratio 
and loan growth are significant non-discretionary drivers of bank provisions. They also 
observe that (i) the increase in bank lending leads to fewer bank provisions in African 
countries with strong investor protection, and (ii) the propensity to use loan loss provisions 
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to smooth income is reduced in environments with strong investor protection. Fonseca and 
Gonzalez (2008) show that the use of loan loss provisions to smooth bank earnings is 
significantly reduced when banks are in environments with strong investor protection. Shen 
and Chih (2005) document similar findings. The findings of Fonseca and Gonzalez (2008), 
Shen and Chih (2005) and Ozili (2018) imply that the presence of strong institutions might 
discourage managerial opportunistic behaviour that take the form of income smoothing via 
loan loss provisions among banks. Currently, there is scant knowledge on the impact of 
investor protection on the provisioning practices of banks in Africa. 
 
3. Hypotheses development 
Nicolo and Pelizzon (2008) show that banks with superior abilities hedge credit risk through 
derivative contracts to reduce adverse selection problems arising from information 
asymmetry. Banks with superior abilities can signal to investors their ability to reduce credit 
risk on bank loan portfolio. Liu and Ryan (1995) and Wahlen (1994) show that banks use 
additional loan loss provisions estimates to signal good news or bad news about banks’ 
future prospect and other bank characteristics after controlling for non-discretionary 
determinant of provisions. Liu et al (1997) observe that higher loan loss provisions are 
perceived as good news only for risky banks while Liu and Ryan (1995) show that high loan 
loss provisions are perceived as good news for banks with loan default risk problems. 
Following the reasoning above, we maintain that loan loss provisions can be a signalling tool 
and we postulate that banks use loan loss provisions to signal good or bad news about the 
riskiness of banks’ intangible asset portfolio as a whole. 
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To develop the hypothesis, we propose that banks, that have insufficient resources and 
weak control systems to ensure that intangible asset investments yield their expected 
benefits, will keep higher discretionary provisions when they increase their investment in 
intangible assets to signal the risk associated with investment in intangible assets. When this 
is the case, a positive relationship between bank provisions and bank intangible assets is 
expected. 
H1: A positive relationship between bank intangibles and loan loss provisions is expected. 
 
On the other hand, banks that have sufficient resources and better control systems to 
ensure that investment in intangible assets yield their expected benefits, will keep fewer 
discretionary provisions when they increase their investment in intangible assets. When this 
is the case, a negative relationship between bank provisions and bank intangible assets is 
expected. 
H2: A negative relationship between bank intangibles and loan loss provisions is expected. 
 
4. Data and Method 
4.1 Data 
Bank income statement and balance sheet information for African banks is obtained from 
Bankscope database (in USD). The sample period is from 2002 to 2014 and is sufficient to 
cover a full economic cycle. We restrict the analysis to 19 African countries that have 
institutional data for investor protection and macroeconomic data for gross domestic 
product. The countries include: Togo, South Africa, Kenya, Ghana, Egypt, Morocco, Algeria, 
Senegal, Tanzania, Namibia, Zambia, Nigeria, Tunisia, Angola, Uganda, Mauritius, Botswana, 
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Malawi and Mozambique. Data for real gross domestic product growth rate is collected 
from World Economic Forum archived in World Bank database while investor protection 
data is collected from Doing Business Project database. See Appendix for source of data and 
variable description. 
Banks that have missing or insufficient loan loss provisions data for four consecutive years in 
Bankscope database were excluded from the sample, and the resulting bank sample is 370 
banks. Of the 370 banks, we further exclude banks with missing or insufficient data for 
intangible asset for up to four consecutive years, and the resulting final sample is 282 banks. 
To clean the data distribution, we eliminate outliers in the observations at the top and 
bottom at 99% and 1%, respectively and the final sample yields an unbalanced panel 
consisting of 282 banks from 19 countries. 
4.2. Methodology 
The model specification to test for the association between loan loss provisions and bank 
intangibles is given below.  
LLPi, j, t = β1TNi, j, t +  β2LOANi, j, t +  β3LOTAi, j, t +  β4CAPi, j, t +  β5ΔGDPj, t 
+  ei, t                                                                                             Equation (1) 
The model in Equation 1 is the static model and we use a dynamic model as a robustness 
test to capture adjustments to bank provisioning that extend beyond a one-year period and 
this adjustment is done by incorporating the lagged dependent variable as an explanatory 
variable into the main model as shown in Equation 2 below: 
LLPi, j, t =  β1LLPi, j, t − 1 +  β2TNi, j, t +  β3LOANi, j, t +  β4LOTAi, j, t +  β5CAPi, j, t 
+  β6ΔGDPj, t +  ei, t                                                                          Equation (2) 
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LLP = loan loss provisions to total asset ratio for bank i at year t and in country j. TN = the 
ratio of intangible asset to total asset for bank i at year t and in country j. See Appendix for 
variable description. 
 
Recall, that we predict a positive sign for TN coefficient if banks with high intangible assets 
investments increase discretionary provisions when they have insufficient resources and 
weak control systems to ensure that investment in intangible assets yield their expected 
benefits while we predict a negative sign for TN coefficient if banks with high investment in 
intangible assets decrease discretionary provisions when they have sufficient resources and 
strong control systems to ensure that investment in intangible assets yield their expected 
benefits. 
 
Prior studies control for the non-discretionary determinants of loan loss provisions (e.g. 
Ahmed et al, 1999; Ozili and Outa, 2017). Loan growth (LOAN) controls for bank provisioning 
in response to credit risk arising from changes in bank lending (Laeven and Majnoni, 2003; 
Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005). Banks will keep higher provisions when they increase loan 
supply in environments with high credit risk vice versa; hence, a positive sign is predicted for 
LOAN coefficient. The second variable is net loan to total asset ratio (LOTA). LOTA controls 
for default risk on banks’ overall loan portfolio (Fonseca and Gonzalez, 2008). Banks with 
higher loan to asset ratio face higher risk of loan default than banks with lower loan to asset 
ratio; hence, banks with higher loan to asset ratio will keep higher provisions, implying a 
positive sign for LOTA coefficient. CAP controls for capital management incentive to 
influence provisions estimates. Banks with low capital levels tend keep higher provisions to 
compensate for their low capital levels and vice versa (Bonin and Kosak, 2013); hence, a 
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negative relationship is predicted for CAP coefficient. Real gross domestic product growth 
rate (ΔGDP) control for bank provisioning behaviour that depends on the state of the 
economic cycle. Bank provisions are generally higher during recessionary periods and 
relatively lower during economic upturns (Laeven and Majnoni, 2003); implying a negative 
relationship between ΔGDP and LLP. Finally, the static model is estimated with fixed effect 
OLS regression and the dynamic model is estimated using Generalized-Method-of-Moments 
(GMM)2 first difference regression. 
 
5. Results 
5.1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation  
Table 1 is a summary of the descriptive statistics for the full sample for the 2002 to 2014 
period. The mean ratio of LLP is 1.1%, and indicates that bank provisions are a small fraction 
of banks total asset. The mean ratio of TN is 0.8% indicating that the bank intangible assets 
are a small proportion of bank total assets. On average, CAP is 16.10% while loan to asset 
ratio (LOTA) is about 50% indicating substantial reliance on loan source of funding. On 
average, LOAN is 20.60% indicating low growth in loans while ΔGDP ratio is about 5.6% 
indicating average economic growth. The correlation results in Table 2 show that TN and 
ΔTN are positively correlated with LLP indicating that increase in intangible assets is 
followed by increase bank provisions. The correlation coefficients for other bank-level 
variables are sufficiently low to be concerned about multicollinearity in the analysis. 
                                                          
2 Laeven and Majnoni (2003) and Fonseca and Gonzalez (2008) also use latter approach. The Arellano and 
Bond (1991) GMM first-difference estimator allow us to control for the autoregressive nature of bank 
provisioning and the likely endogeneity of the explanatory variables. We also report the GMM Sarjan (J) test 
for the adequacy of instruments in the GMM estimation. We also report the AR (1) and AR (2) GMM test for 
first-order and second-order serial correlation. 
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5.2. Regression Results 
The results are reported in Table 3 and 4. TN coefficient reports a negative sign and is 
significant at 1 % level in Column 1 of Table 3 and 4. This result confirms the second 
hypothesis, and implies that banks with high investment in intangible assets keep fewer 
discretionary provisions to signal low risk associated with intangible asset investments when 
they have sufficient resources and better control systems to ensure that investment in 
intangible assets yield their expected benefits. 
For the control variables, LOTA coefficient reports the expected sign in Table 3 and 4, and 
implies that banks keep higher provision when they have higher loan default risk. CAP 
coefficient reports the expected negative sign in Table 3 and 4, and implies that banks keep 
higher loan loss provisions when they have lower equity capital and vice versa. LOAN and 
ΔGDP coefficients report conflicting signs in Table 3 and 4. Dynamic provisions (LLPt-1) 
coefficient is negatively significant in Table 4, indicating that high provisions in the current 
period are followed by fewer provisions in the next period and vice versa. 
 
5.3. Further Tests 
5.3.1. Change in Intangible Assets 
Next, we test whether bank loan loss provisions are significantly associated with changes in 
intangible asset values after controlling for other determinants of loan loss provisions. We 
replace the intangible asset ratio variable (TN) with the change in intangible asset to total 
asset ratio (ΔTN) and the new model is shown in equation 3.  
LLPi, j, t = β1ΔTNi, j, t +  β2LOANi, j, t +  β3LOTAi, j, t +  β4CAPi, j, t +  β5ΔGDPj, t 
+  ei, t                                                                                          Equation (3) 
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The result is report in Table 3 and 4. ΔTN coefficient reports a negative sign in Column 2 of 
Table 3 and 4 and is significant in Table 4, indicating that loan loss provisions is inversely 
associated with changes in intangible assets. This result confirms the second hypothesis. 
5.3.2. Earnings smoothing and transient intangibles 
Next, we test whether the propensity to use loan loss provisions to smooth bank earnings is 
influenced by transient changes in the level of bank intangible assets. To do this, we first 
incorporate the earnings before tax and provisions variable into the model which is the 
earnings smoothing variable. To capture transient changes in bank intangible assets, we 
introduce two dummy variables, TNH and TNL, to represent periods when banks have high 
and low intangibles assets, respectively. The TNH dummy variable equals one if the  
intangible asset to total asset ratio (TN) ratio is above 1% of total bank assets and zero 
otherwise, representing periods when African banks have high or substantial intangibles 
while the TNL dummy variable equals one if intangible asset to total asset ratio (TN) ratio is 
less than 0.5% of bank total assets and zero otherwise, representing periods when African 
banks have low intangibles. We then interact TNH and THL dummies with the EBTP 
coefficient. The modified equation is shown below:  
𝐿𝐿𝑃 =  𝛽1𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑡 − 1 +  𝛽2𝑇𝑁 +  𝛽3𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 +  𝛽4𝐿𝑂𝑇𝐴 +  𝛽5𝐶𝐴𝑃 + 𝛽6𝛥𝐺𝐷𝑃 
+  𝛽7𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑃 + 𝛽8𝑇𝑁𝐻 + 𝛽9𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑃 ∗ 𝑇𝑁𝐻 +  𝛽10𝑇𝑁𝐿 + 𝛽11𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑃 ∗ 𝑇𝑁𝐿
+  𝑒𝑖, 𝑡                                                                       𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (4) 
The results are reported in Column 3 and 4 of Table 3 and 4. The EBTP coefficient is 
positively significant, and suggests that loan loss provisions are used to smooth reported 
earnings while EBTP*TNH coefficient reports a negative sign and is significant in Column 3 of 
Table 3 and 4, implying that banks do not use loan loss provisions to smooth income when 
they have substantial investment in intangible assets. EBTP*TNL coefficient reports a 
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positive sign and is significant in Column 4 of Table 3 and 4, indicating that banks use loan 
loss provisions to smooth income when they have low intangible assets. Interestingly, this 
suggest that African banks possibly use loan loss provisions to smooth bank earnings to 
appear profitable when they have low investment in intangible assets that yields low 
returns which do not significantly improve bank profitability or bank value. 
5.3.3. The influence of investor protection 
Next, we test whether the association between loan loss provision and bank intangibles is 
influenced by minority shareholder right protection differences across African countries. To 
do this, we interact TN with INVP and the result is reported in Column 5 of Table 3 and 4. 
  
𝐿𝐿𝑃 =  𝛽1𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑡 − 1 +  𝛽2𝑇𝑁 +  𝛽3𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 +  𝛽4L𝑂𝑇𝐴 +  𝛽5𝐶𝐴𝑃 +  𝛽6𝛥𝐺𝐷𝑃 
+  𝛽7𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑃 + 𝛽8𝑇𝑁𝐻 + 𝛽9𝑇𝑁𝐿 +  𝛽10𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑃 + 𝛽11𝑇𝑁 ∗ 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑃
+ 𝛽12𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑃 ∗ 𝑇𝑁𝐻 ∗ 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑃 + 𝛽13𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑃 ∗ 𝑇𝑁𝐿 ∗ 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑃 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡     𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 5 
 
TN*INVP coefficient reports a negative sign and is weakly significant in Table 3, and is 
positive but insignificant Table 4, indicating that the association between loan loss 
provisions and bank intangibles is weakened when banks are in countries with strong 
minority shareholder right protection. Finally, we test whether the association between loan 
loss provisions, transient bank intangibles and income smoothing incentives is influenced by 
differences in the level of minority shareholder right protection. The result is reported in 
Column 6 and 7 of Table 3 and 4. INVP*EBTP*TNH coefficient is negatively significant, 
indicating that banks in African countries with strong minority shareholder right protection 
do not use provisions to smooth income when they have substantial intangible assets. 
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INVP*EBTP*TNL coefficient is insignificant in Column 7 of Table 3 but is positive and weakly 
significant in Table 4, hence no meaningful conclusion can be drawn. 
 
6. Conclusion  
In this study, we investigate the relationship between loan loss provisions and bank 
intangibles. Prior studies show that discretionary loan loss provisions are used for several 
purposes rather than solely for credit risk management purposes. We extend the debate to 
understand whether discretionary loan loss provisions are also driven by the level of, and 
changes in, bank intangible assets in the balance sheet of banks. Our findings indicate that 
discretionary loan loss provision is inversely related with bank intangible assets and change 
in intangible assets. Also, African banks appear to use discretionary provisions to smooth 
income when they have low intangible assets but do not use discretionary provisions to 
smooth income when they have substantial or high intangible assets. Moreover, the 
association between discretionary loan loss provisions and bank intangibles is weakened 
among banks in African countries that have strong investor protection. Further, banks in 
African countries with strong minority shareholder right protection do not use discretionary 
provisions to smooth income when they have substantial intangibles. 
 
The main implication of the findings is that strong investor protection in Africa can 
discourage African banks from using discretionary loan loss provisions to signal the riskiness 
of intangible asset investments.  
 
Finally, the study did not use data on actual gains and losses realized from investment in 
intangible assets because (i) actual gains and losses from intangible asset investments are 
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difficult to measure, (ii) such gains and losses from intangible asset investments extend 
beyond one or more years, and (iii) they are subject to overestimation or underestimation 
due to recognitions issues if reported in financial reports. Hence, future research can 
provide additional insights by employing data on gains and losses on intangible assets to 
examine the relationship between bank provisions and intangible asset valuation, when 
such data become available. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics: Summary 
 LLP TN ΔTN CAP INVP LOAN LOTA EBTP ΔGDP 
Mean 0.011 0.008 0.126 16.109 4.614 0.206 50.968 0.032 0.056 
Median 0.006 0.003 0.104 11.945 5.300 0.167 51.345 0.029 0.052 
Maximum 0.269 0.219 -4.03 99.860 8.000 0.992 121.9 0.335 0.337 
Minimum -0.286 0.000 -1.000 -24.000 -1.070 -0.816 0.000 -0.296 -0.076 
          
Observations 2622 2125 1809 2744 2316 2353 2722 2610 3666 
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Table 2: Correlation Matrix 
           
Correlation LLP TN ΔTN EBTP LOTA LOAN ΔGDP TNH TNL INVP 
LLP 1.000          
 -----          
TN 0.219*** 1.000         
 0.000 -----         
ΔTN 0.038 0.0453 1.000        
 0.195 0.122 -----        
EBTP 0.403*** 0.110*** -0.001 1.000       
 0.000 0.000 0.963 -----       
LOTA 0.001 -0.015 -0.001 0.063** 1.000      
 0.986 0.618 0.986 0.030 -----      
LOAN 0.043 -0.008 0.044 0.094*** -0.045 1.000     
 0.137 0.759 0.129 0.001 0.116 -----     
ΔGDP -0.018 -0.078*** 0.031 -0.014 -0.236*** 0.280*** 1.000    
 0.522 0.007 0.295 0.626 0.000 0.000 -----    
TNH 0.132*** 0.614*** 0.031 0.017 -0.004 -0.057* -0.087*** 1.000   
 0.000 0.000 0.290 0.548 0.899 0.051 0.003 -----   
TNL -0.108*** -0.505*** -0.032 0.005 -0.053* 0.014 0.082*** -0.667*** 1.000  
 0.000 0.000 0.275 0.866 0.069 0.622 0.005 0.000 -----  
INVP 0.066** 0.044 -0.049* 0.016 0.027 -0.033 -0.077*** 0.022 -0.019 1.000 
 0.024 0.132 0.089 0.571 0.352 0.262 0.009 0.454 0.502 ----- 
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Table 3:  Main Regression – Fixed Effect OLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
C 0.009*** 
(3.28) 
0.006* 
(1.89) 
0.004 
(1.45) 
0.014*** 
(4.83) 
0.005 
(0.93) 
0.003 
(0.63) 
0.005 
(0.97) 
TN -0.175*** 
(-3.84) 
 -0.157*** 
(-3.21) 
-0.181*** 
(-3.96) 
0.027 
(0.27) 
-0.138*** 
(-2.79) 
-0.135*** 
(-2.93) 
ΔTN  0.0001 
(0.35) 
     
LOAN -0.006*** 
(-3.10) 
-0.003* 
(-1.68) 
-0.007*** 
(-4.21) 
-0.007*** 
(-4.19) 
-0.007*** 
(-3.98) 
-0.008*** 
(-4.75) 
-0.008*** 
(-4.69) 
LOTA 0.0001*** 
(2.80) 
0.0002*** 
(2.77) 
0.0001** 
(2.17) 
0.0001* 
(1.93) 
0.0002*** 
(3.44) 
0.0001*** 
(2.89) 
0.0001*** 
(3.01) 
CAP -
0.0003*** 
(-4.25) 
-0.0003*** 
(-3.24) 
-0.0005*** 
(-7.03) 
-
0.0005*** 
(-6.51) 
-0.0001 
(-1.07) 
-0.0003*** 
(-3.43) 
-0.0003*** 
(-3.77) 
ΔGDP 0.009 
(0.67) 
0.001 
(0.07) 
0.019 
(1.37) 
0.018 
(1.26) 
0.008 
(0.69) 
0.011 
(0.93) 
0.013 
(1.07) 
TNH   0.009*** 
(5.34) 
  0.004*** 
(2.70) 
 
TNL    -0.013*** 
(-9.04) 
  -0.002 
(-1.49) 
EBTP   0.306*** 
(13.49) 
0.081*** 
(3.25) 
 0.201*** 
(9.59) 
0.184*** 
(8.60) 
EBTP*TNH   -0.223*** 
(-6.87) 
    
EBTP*TNL    0.293*** 
(10.17) 
   
INVP     -0.0002 
(-0.22) 
-0.0004 
(-0.37) 
-0.0003 
(-0.31) 
INVP*TN     -0.030* 
(-1.92) 
  
INVP*EBTP*TNH      -0.012*** 
(-2.86) 
 
INVTP*EBTP*TNL       -0.001 
(-0.18) 
Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-Statistic 7.02 5.45 8.39 8.96 9.11 10.14 10.03 
p-value (F-Statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Durbin Watson 1.85 1.99 1.89 1.91 1.97 1.99 2.01 
Observations 1783 1493 1772 1771 1217 1211 1210 
T-Statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively.  OLS 
regression include country, bank and year fixed effects. OLS standard error is not clustered. ΔTN = change in intangible to total 
asset ratio. EBTP = Earnings before profit and tax to total asset ratio. CAP = total equity to total asset ratio. LOTA = total loan to 
total asset ratio. LOAN = loan growth rate. ΔGDP = real gross domestic product growth rate. INVP = minority shareholder right 
protection, higher values indicate strong investor protection. TNH = dummy variable equals one if intangible asset to total asset 
ratio (TN) ratio is above 1% and zero otherwise, representing periods when banks have high intangibles. TNL = dummy variable 
equals one if intangible asset to total asset ratio (TN) ratio is less than 0.5% and zero otherwise, representing periods when 
banks have low intangibles. 
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Table 4:  Main Regression – GMM estimation result 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
LLPt-1 -0.048*** 
(-13.49) 
-0.010*** 
(-4.08) 
-0.103*** 
(-21.33) 
-0.152*** 
(-16.21) 
0.274*** 
(4.86) 
0.111* 
(1.95) 
0.160*** 
(2.68) 
TN -0.228** 
(-1.98) 
 -0.727*** 
(-4.05) 
-0.659*** 
(-5.07) 
-1.086 
(-1.32) 
-0.699** 
(-2.34) 
-0.421* 
(-1.65) 
ΔTN  -0.001*** 
(-2.83) 
     
LOAN -0.010*** 
(-5.41) 
-0.017*** 
(-10.33) 
-0.009** 
(-2.52) 
-0.018*** 
(-4.72) 
-0.016*** 
(-3.63) 
-0.016** 
(-1.98) 
-0.019** 
(-2.29) 
LOTA 0.001*** 
(15.46) 
0.001*** 
(13.72) 
0.0002 
(1.47) 
0.0005*** 
(3.58) 
0.0004*** 
(2.48) 
0.0001 
(-0.36) 
0.0003 
(1.32) 
CAP -0.003*** 
(-25.29) 
-0.003*** 
(-10.60) 
-0.002*** 
(-15.09) 
-0.002*** 
(-7.46) 
0.0004 
(1.09) 
-0.00002 
(-0.05) 
0.00004 
(0.11) 
ΔGDP -0116*** 
(-16.26) 
-0.071*** 
(-6.10) 
-0.002 
(-0.07) 
0.065*** 
(3.02) 
-0.035 
(-0.56) 
-0.036 
(-0.39) 
-0.176** 
(-2.52) 
TNH   0.022*** 
(3.20) 
  0.027* 
(1.79) 
 
TNL    -0.014*** 
(-3.89) 
  0.021*** 
(3.68) 
EBTP   0.688*** 
(17.63) 
0.134*** 
(9.40) 
 0.484*** 
(6.05) 
0.308** 
(2.41) 
EBTP*TNH   -0.485*** 
(-12.14) 
    
EBTP*TNL    0.818*** 
(15.04) 
   
INVP     0.009 
(1.29) 
-0.007 
(-1.53) 
-0.021*** 
(-3.15) 
INVP*TN     0.097 
(0.93) 
  
INVP*EBTP*TNH      -0.041** 
(-2.37) 
 
INVP*EBTP*TNL       0.026* 
(1.65) 
Sarjan (J-statistic) 52.03 48.06 45.74 51.70 23.27 23.94 11.37 
P-value (J Statistic) 0.394 0.429 0.483 0.261 0.592 0.465 0.986 
AR(1) 0.238 0.145 0.062 0.029  0.001 0.0004 
AR(2) 0.405 0.170 0.229 0.067 0.091 0.071 0.079 
Observations 1235 1194 1226 1225 929 924 923 
T-Statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively.   
GMM regression is based on Arellano and Bond (1991) first-difference GMM estimator and includes first-difference and 
period fixed effects. The GMM panel estimator controls for potential endogeneity by using instruments based on lagged 
values of the explanatory variables in the model. GMM standard error is not clustered. EBTP = Earnings before profit and tax 
to total asset ratio. CAP = total equity to total asset ratio. LOTA = total loan to total asset ratio. LOAN = loan growth rate. 
ΔGDP = real gross domestic product growth rate. INVP = minority shareholder right protection and higher values indicate 
strong investor protection. TNH = dummy variable equals one if intangible asset to total asset ratio (TN) ratio is above 1% 
and zero otherwise, representing periods when banks have high intangibles. TNL = dummy variable equals one if intangible 
asset to total asset ratio (TN) ratio is less than 0.5% and zero otherwise, representing periods when banks have low 
intangibles. 
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Appendix 
Definition and Source of Main Variables 
Variable Description Source 
LLP Ratio of loan loss provisions to total assets. Bankscope database 
TN Ratio of intangibles to total assets. Bankscope database 
ΔTN Change in intangibles to total assets ratio. Bankscope database 
CAP Ratio of total equity to total assets. Bankscope database 
EBTP Ratio of earnings before provisions and taxes to total assets. Bankscope database 
LOAN Loan growth is change in gross loan outstanding. Bankscope database 
LOTA Ratio of total loans to total assets.  Bankscope database 
ΔGDP Growth in real gross domestic product World Economic Forum 
INVP Refer to ‘strength of investor protection index’. It measures 
the strength of minority shareholder protection against the 
misuse of corporate assets by directors for personal gain. The 
index ranges from 0 to 10 with higher values indicating 
stronger minority shareholders protection. 
Doing Business Project, 
archived in World Bank 
database. 
 
